Volume 55

Issue 1

Article 6

December 1952

Constitutional Law--Privacy--Right of Individual on Public
Conveyances
G. D. H. S.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
G. D. S., Constitutional Law--Privacy--Right of Individual on Public Conveyances, 55 W. Va. L. Rev. (1952).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss1/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

S.: Constitutional Law--Privacy--Right of Individual on Public Convey

West Virginia Law Review
Published by the College of Law of West Virginia University.
publication of The West Virginia Bar Association.

Official

STUDENT BOARD OF EDITORS
Willis Owen Shay, Editor in Chief
Lee Allen Strimbeck, Associate Editor
Carmine James Cann
Edison W. Keener
Robert Alan Klayman

Isaac Murray Lewis
Giles D. H. Snyder
Carl Frederick Stucky, Jr.

Marlyn E. Lugar, Faculty Editor in Charge
Louise Farrell Conaway, Business Manager

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVACY-RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL ON PUB-

public utilities commission, on the protest
of D, passenger, investigated the use of transit radio receivers on
streetcars in Washington, D. C., and determined that such was
consistent with public convenience, comfort, and safety. The programs contained music, news, and short commercials. The question is whether such is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment as an invasion of the constitutional right of privacy of the
passengers. Held, on certiorari, reversing the lower court, that the
right of privacy "is substantially limited by the rights of others
when its possessor travels on a public thorofare or rides in a public
conveyance." Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 72 Sup. Ct. 813
(1952).
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the passengers are on the streetcar from necessity and are a "captive audience",
their attention thereby being compelled, and that such required
listening would lead to the control of men's minds. The problem
involves a new phase in the law of privacy, with no precedent, and
we must seek the answer from related fields.
Clearly, at common law noise alone may constitute an abatable
nuisance. Baltimore &cPotomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church,
108 U.S. 317 (1883); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201
(6th Cir. 1932); Chicago v. Reuter Bros. Iron Works, 398 Ill. 202,
LIC CONVEYANCES.-P,
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75 N.E.2d 355 (1947); Ritz v. Woman's Club, 114 W. Va. 675, 173
S.E. 564 (1934). Music, a form of noise, may also become a
nuisance enjoinable in equity. Edmunds v. Duff, 280 Pa. 385, 124
At. 489 (1924); State v. Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 18 S.E.2d 372 (1942);
Snyder v. Cabell, 29 W. Va. 48, 1 S.E. 241 (1887). To be an actionable nuisance, however, such noise (music) must be so excessive
and unreasonable as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities; thus, injury to one of
high sensitivity would not render the noise abatable, unless the
noise were so substantial and unreasonable as to affect the health
of an ordinary man. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson,
288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857 (1941); Meadowbrook Swimming Club
v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 At. 146 (1938); Tortorella v. H. Traiser
& Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933). Admitting, therefore,
the right of the property owner to abate noise as a nuisance if it
meets the above requirements, is this common law right of such a
character as to be protected as a constitutional right of the individual under due process of law? D thought there was a deprivation of his liberty because of an unpermitted invasion of his
freedom to converse and to meditate.
An ordinance forbidding the use of sound trucks emitting
"loud and raucous noises" on public streets has been held constitutional the court there recognizing the right of citizens to some
degree of quiet and order needed to carry on their activities, etc.
Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). In Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948), where a similar statute was held unconstitutional
on its face because of the discretion given to the chief of police in
granting permission to use sound devices, such being a previous
restraint of the right of free speech, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent stated: "If uncontrolled [sound amplification], the result
is intrusion into cherished privacy ... surely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen." However, in
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), a municipal ordinance
forbidding persons to summon residents to the door to pass handbills was held unconstitutional as a denial of freedom of speech and
press, appellant being a "Jehovah's Witness" distributing advertisements of a religious meeting. The individual's rights are not
absolute even in his own home.
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Thus, the right of privacy at best is very limited, and the court
jealously guards against its invocation to the prejudice of the
rights of others as indicated by Martin v. Struthers, supra. Applying
the doctrine of abatement of noise as a nuisance, we may constructively state that only where the infringement is excessive and uneasonable to a man of ordinary sensibilities will the court consider
bringing into play right of privacy. Here, the programs were not
unreasonable, and the great majority of passengers found them
inoffensive and favored their continuance; D does not represent
the ordinary man. The holding of the court appears just, considering the rights of all persons involved. In answering Mr. Justice
Douglas's objection, if ever control of the mind were threatened,
then such would be clearly unreasonable and a valid basis for
objection.
G. D. H. S.

CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF PARDON ON HABITUAL CRIMINAL

STATuT.-Habeas corpus proceeding by P to obtain release from
imprisonment for life for third offense under the habitual criminal
statute [W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 11, §§ 18 and 19 (Michie, 1949) ].
P claimed that the statute did not apply since, after commission and
conviction of first two offenses punishable by confinement in the
penitentiary, he was given a pardon by the governor. The circuit
court overruled D's demurrer to the petition and, on joint motion
of the parties, certified the question to the supreme court. Held,
that a pardon by the governor of convictions for offenses punishable by confinement in the penitentiary does not exempt the
prisoner from increased punishment under the habitual criminal
statute. Reversed and remanded. Dean v. Skeen, 70 S.E.2d 256
(W. Va. 1952).
This is the first case in West Virginia determining the effect
of a full pardon on the application of the habitual criminal statute.
In State v. Fisher, 123 W. Va. 745, 18 S.E.2d 649 (1941), the
court, in dealing with a conditional pardon, held that it had no
effect upon prior convictions and that the habitual criminal statute
applied. The court also expressed the opinion that an unconditional
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